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Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons

Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Introduction

1. The total elimination of nuclear weapons and the legally binding assurance that they will never be produced again is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. To achieve that goal, nuclear-weapon States need to implement their nuclear obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their disarmament commitments agreed upon in 1995, 2000 and 2010, including the unequivocal undertaking towards the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility.

2. In that context, negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention which includes a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are needed.

3. The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the total elimination of nuclear weapons consisting of the following concrete steps and measures, particularly through the negotiation and adoption of a nuclear weapons convention which includes a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as a basis for consideration by the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than exhaustive. Nevertheless, it should be understood that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are mutually reinforcing and inextricably linked.

Plan of action

First phase: 2020-2025

4. Commencement of negotiations on and conclusion of an international, non-discriminatory comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons which:

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(a) Prohibits the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(b) Provides for their destruction;

(c) Includes a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance with the provisions of the convention.

5. Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention, the immediate implementation of the following measures, which include agreed steps from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, must be undertaken:

(a) A moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes by nuclear-weapon States;

(b) The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the ratification of the Treaty by the remaining nuclear-weapon States;

(c) The cessation of all nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

(d) Ending all types of nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites and their associated infrastructure;

(e) The cessation of the upgrading and modernization of the existing nuclear weapon systems through new technology, including nuclear weapon research and development by nuclear-weapon States;

(f) The cessation of the role of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines of nuclear-weapon States, leading to the elimination of such a role;

(g) Provisions of unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States;

(h) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, in particular in the Middle East;

(i) The reduction of nuclear arsenals and de-alerting by nuclear-weapon States.

Second phase: 2025-2030

6. Acceleration of the ratification and early entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, which includes a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

7. Upon entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, the following steps must be undertaken:

(a) The establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance with the provisions of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons;

(b) Declarations by possessor States parties of their stocks of nuclear weapons and material usable for nuclear weapons;

(c) The preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles;

(d) The separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles;

(e) The placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads;

(f) The transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials, to "peaceful purposes";

(g) The irreversible placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

Third phase: 2030-2035

8. Further measures for the full implementation of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons and of its verification regime include:

(a) The elimination of all nuclear weapons in an irreversible and verifiable manner;

(b) The conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to "peaceful purposes" in an irreversible and verifiable manner;

(c) The placement of all nuclear material, equipment and facilities under IAEA safeguards.

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Nuclear disarmament

Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the Treaty is an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.

2. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that each article of the Treaty is binding on all States parties at all times and in all circumstances.

3. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the principled positions of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects. The Group stresses its deep concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use or threat of use. The Group also reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the legally binding assurance that they will never be produced again is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group further stresses that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation must be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.

4. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of the obligation of nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and building upon the 13 practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in particular the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the goal of the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament, set out in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, that includes concrete measures to accelerate progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

5. In this context, the Group further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed, in action 5 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, to

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accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, through: (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) addressing the question of all nuclear weapons, regardless of their type or their location, as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increasing mutual confidence.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations by the nuclear-weapon States, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty and the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

8. In the context of the review of action 5 (c) of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by military and security doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States that set out the rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent posture review by one of the nuclear-weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances in which these weapons could be used. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also remains deeply concerned by the strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which justifies the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and maintains, unjustifiably, the concept of security based on nuclear military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.

9. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.

10. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its strong call for the full and systematic implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference, including through the implementation of the 13 practical steps, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which was also reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference.

11. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with action 3 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, have committed to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. The Group expresses its disappointment over the lack of progress in the implementation of this commitment. In this regard, the Group

calls for the full compliance of the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings towards fulfilling their legal obligations under article VI of the Treaty.

12. In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference.

13. Noting the reports submitted to the Preparatory Committee in 2014 regarding action 5 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls upon the 2020 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

14. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the convening of the first-ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament on 26 September 2013, and underlines that the strong support expressed at that meeting for taking urgent and effective measures to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons demonstrated that nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority of the international community.

15. In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 68/32, 70/34 and 71/71, entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament", in which, in particular, the Assembly: (a) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard; and (c) declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the adoption of resolution 69/58 on this subject. The Group calls for the full implementation of these resolutions, which provide a concrete pathway for realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament.

16. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls action 6 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, through which all States have agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. The Group deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee to negotiate on nuclear disarmament.

17. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the urgent necessity of negotiating and bringing to a conclusion a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame.

18. In the same vein, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its call to the Conference on Disarmament to immediately establish, as the highest priority, a subsidiary body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.

19. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear

explosive devices and eliminating all the past production and existing stockpiles of such materials, in an irreversible and verifiable manner and taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including their past production, existing stockpiles and future production of fissile materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive safeguards.

20. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

21. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. In order to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities.

22. The Group is also concerned about the lack of tangible progress in enhancing transparency, in accordance with action 5 (g) of the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference.

23. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of the New START Treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon in it.

24. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons and, accordingly, calls on the nuclear-weapon States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to all such cuts, to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

25. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses concern over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the threat of weaponization of outer space and at the negative security consequences of the deployment of such systems, which could trigger an arms race or arms races and lead to further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. The Group emphasizes the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space.

The Group further emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 71/31.

26. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.

27. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals, and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

28. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further reaffirms that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that, by becoming parties to the Treaty, have given up the nuclear weapon option, inter alia, to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.

29. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

30. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that "there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" and that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law".

31. Accordingly, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the view that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States shall seriously refrain, at any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from military doctrines.

32. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and realizing its entry into force through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear

disarmament and the enhancement of international peace and security. The Group underlines that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in this regard.

33. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls its working paper entitled "Draft elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons", which was submitted to the 2015 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2015/WP.14), and has presented an updated version of this plan to the 2017 Preparatory Committee.

34. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates its call for the establishment, as a matter of priority, of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.

35. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its determination to continue collective efforts in pursuing the realization of its priorities in the 2020 review process of the Treaty.

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Security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms its view that the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the legally binding assurance that they will never be produced again is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group is of the firm belief that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States that have given up the nuclear-weapon option by becoming parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.

2. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the granting of such assurances by all five nuclear-weapon States parties to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties is a commitment, the fulfilment of which provides an essential security benefit to the States parties to the Treaty and is necessary to strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and its credibility.

3. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its concern that, in spite of long-standing requests by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable negative security assurances, no tangible progress has been made in that regard.

4. In that regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty takes note of the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they give very limited, conditional and insufficient security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. It is the view of the Group that such unilateral statements fail to meet any of the requirements of universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

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5. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, at successive conferences of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and ministerial conferences of the Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, such as those envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals, and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and both the vertical and horizontal sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the Group believes that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which is the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States should seriously refrain, in any circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty.

8. The Movement expresses its deepest concern over the immediate, indiscriminate and massive death and destruction that would be caused by any nuclear weapon detonation and its long-term catastrophic consequences for human health, the environment and other vital economic resources, thus endangering the life of present and future generations. The Group affirms the importance of humanitarian considerations in the context of all deliberations and efforts in promoting the goal of nuclear disarmament.

9. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law. The Group further believes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law.

10. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the validity of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, that "there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" and that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law".

11. In that regard, while deploring the military and security doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and the strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which are based on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and which maintain unjustifiable concepts of security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly

calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines.

12. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is also of the view that, pending the conclusion of negotiations on universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should fully respect their existing commitments with regard to negative security assurances, which are limited, conditional and insufficient, and should extend these assurances, without any condition and discrimination, to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

13. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the parties to the Treaty reaffirmed and recognized that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The Group expresses its dissatisfaction over the lack of required political will and efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to fully address this legitimate interest. The Group, therefore, calls on the participants in the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in addition to keeping nuclear disarmament as their highest priority, to fully address this legitimate right as a matter of priority.

14. Moreover, the Group stresses that the urgent negotiations on the provision of the effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable, universal and legally binding security assurances by all the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances should also be pursued as a matter of priority and without further delay.

15. In keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

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Promotion of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Joint working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates)

The present joint working paper highlights the steps that all the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can take in the pillar of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, thereby enhancing the implementation of the Treaty and contributing to the strengthening of the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty.

Overview

1. Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

2. Under this article, nuclear science and technology and its peaceful applications have made substantial contributions to improving the quality of life and the well-being of people around the world.

3. Peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology also play a role in realizing the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and, to this end, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative believes that access to the benefits made available by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be enlarged to the greatest extent practicable.

4. In this regard, it is important for States to reach out beyond those involved in the nuclear field to inform international development practitioners about the contributions that nuclear energy can make to achieving sustainable development objectives. Furthermore, ensuring the highest levels of safety and security, ensuring effective communication to stakeholders and raising public awareness of the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are essential to building the acceptance needed to enhance the application of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

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Basic radiation education, training and human resources development are also important for the sustainable development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency

5. In promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has long played an indispensable role. The Agency's activities under "Atoms for Peace and Development" are contributing to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

6. To continue responding to the growing needs in the area of nuclear science and technology applications for development, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative encourages IAEA to work in a more systematic manner to raise awareness of its activities with key players in the field of development and to strengthen partnerships with relevant organizations to enhance the synergies between relevant activities. In this context, the International Conference on the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme to be held in 2017, the International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the Twenty-first Century to be held in the United Arab Emirates in 2017 and the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science, Technology and Applications for Peaceful Uses to be held in 2018 represent important opportunities to realize this goal, and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative will actively support these IAEA events.

7. At the same time, IAEA is encouraged to make further efforts to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and sustainability of its technical cooperation programme. In particular, all States parties need to take responsibility to pay their target share to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, which is the most important mechanism for the implementation of the technical cooperation programme, and to take practical steps to ensure higher rates of attainment for the Fund. Public-private partnerships should be strengthened with the objective of enhancing the technical cooperation programme and its socioeconomic impact in member States.

8. With regard to the enhancement of the technical cooperation programme, it should also be noted that regional cooperative arrangements, such as the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific, the Cooperative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology, the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean and the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology, can be effective and efficient by providing assistance and facilitating technology transfer, complementing the technical cooperation activities of IAEA in individual countries and promoting South-South and triangular cooperation.

9. Furthermore, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative welcomes the increasing number of IAEA member States that have made voluntary contributions through the Peaceful Uses Initiative to IAEA activities in relation to applying peaceful applications of nuclear technology. This has enabled the Agency to further develop its programme and to be more flexible and expeditious in responding to emergency needs, as most recently demonstrated by its swift response to the Zika virus outbreak.

10. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative welcomes that contributions to the Peaceful Uses Initiative have reached 100 million euros in total and encourages States parties, groups of countries and relevant organizations in a position to do so to build upon this achievement.

11. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative welcomes the steady progress on the Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL) project, which will establish a strong foundation for the development of fully fit-for-purpose and modern laboratories to support continued growth in nuclear applications. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative also encourages IAEA to make further efforts on resource mobilization for ReNuAL+.

Nuclear safety

12. While it is the prerogative of each State to establish its own national energy policy, including fuel cycle policies, in accordance with its national requirements and taking into account relevant international obligations, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied, at all its stages, by commitments to and ongoing implementation of the highest standards of safety and security, as well as effective safeguards with full transparency.

13. To this end, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative emphasizes the importance of the development, implementation and continuous improvement of appropriate infrastructure, as well as efforts and investments in human resources development. It is also important that States parties continue to build upon lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident to enhance worldwide nuclear safety, with scientifically based policymaking, implementation and communication to the public.

14. In developing safety infrastructure and adequate human resources, international organizations, such as IAEA, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and other multilateral cooperation frameworks, have played an important role, establishing safety standards and norms, providing peer review services and sharing good practices. International cooperation through such frameworks should therefore be further encouraged.

15. In addition, while acknowledging that responsibility for nuclear safety within a State rests entirely with that State and recognizing the increasing number of countries considering introducing nuclear power to their energy supply mix, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative affirms the importance of international cooperation in nuclear safety.

16. In this regard, States parties are encouraged to adopt the OECD common approaches for officially supported export credits and environmental and social due diligence and to host relevant IAEA peer review missions, such as the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review Mission, the Integrated Regulatory Review Service and the Site and External Events Design Review Services, at the appropriate phase of a nuclear programme and prior to commissioning their first nuclear power plant in particular.

17. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative recognizes that international conventions related to nuclear safety, including the Convention on Nuclear Safety, together with the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, provide a platform for international peer review and cooperation for the enhancement of nuclear safety. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative calls upon those States parties that have not done so to participate in such conventions and all contracting parties to the conventions to work towards their effective and sustainable implementation. Those States parties who have not yet done so are also encouraged to join the international nuclear liability instruments.

Nuclear security

18. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative welcomes the progress made over the past several years in developing and enhancing national nuclear security regimes worldwide, as noted in the communiqué issued at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit and the ministerial declaration of the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions, convened by IAEA in 2016.

19. The implementation of nuclear security and physical protection measures remains a fundamental responsibility of States in accordance with their obligations. All States should maintain, at all times, effective and comprehensive nuclear security of all nuclear and other radioactive material under their control. While recognizing the distinctions between nuclear security and nuclear safety measures, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative also reaffirms the common aim of and important synergies between these two related areas.

20. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative underlines that measures to strengthen nuclear security facilitate international cooperation in the fields of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as nuclear security is essential to the responsible production, storage, transfer and use of nuclear and other radioactive material, to the exchange of nuclear material for peaceful purposes and for maintaining public support for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

21. States parties are encouraged to recognize the challenge posed by emerging nuclear security threats and to take the necessary action to mitigate those threats, for instance, the threat of cyberattacks against nuclear installations, and the need to take effective measures to strengthen computer security. States parties also need to ensure adequate national capabilities, based on national security threat assessments, to prevent, detect and respond to illicit trafficking of and other unauthorized activities associated with nuclear and other radioactive material.

22. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative reaffirms the central role of IAEA in strengthening the international nuclear security architecture, in facilitating and coordinating international cooperation among relevant organizations and initiatives and in providing assistance to States parties in fulfilling their nuclear security responsibilities. In this regard, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative welcomes the outcome of the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions, organized by IAEA in Vienna in December 2016, which emphasized this role. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative further encourages IAEA to continue to assist States, upon request, in strengthening their national regulatory control of nuclear and other radioactive material.

23. In helping IAEA fulfil its central role in facilitating and coordinating efforts to enhance nuclear security worldwide, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative encourages States parties to provide, where feasible, IAEA with reliable and sufficient technical, financial and human resources to undertake its nuclear security-related activities, including through voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

24. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative welcomes the entry into force on 8 May 2016 of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 2005 and stresses the importance of its full and universal implementation. All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to become parties to the amended Convention and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and to fully implement their obligations.

25. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative expresses its serious concern over the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or materials needed to produce nuclear weapons, and reminds States of the necessity of fulfilling their obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

26. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative supports the activities of international initiatives, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, to continuously strengthen nuclear security as well as encourage continued engagement with relevant stakeholders, such as members of civil society and the nuclear industry. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative welcomes the establishment of the Nuclear Security Contact Group with its aim to sustain action to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges.

27. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative supports the efforts of States to provide education and training opportunities to personnel involved in nuclear science and technology and its peaceful applications, including by establishing centres of excellence. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative further encourages centres of excellence to collaborate internationally and regionally to enhance capacity-building efforts, such as through the Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Network and the International Nuclear Security Education Network.

II. Looking back: 2010-2015 review cycle of the Treaty

5. The first sessions of the preparatory committee for a review conference are traditionally appropriate opportunities to reflect on previous review cycles. Addressing the drawbacks and shortcomings of past cycles is a necessary, if not compulsory, exercise aimed at avoiding similar unfavourable outcomes in the future. It is imperative not only for avoiding future frustrations, but also for planning ahead and charting the way forward.

6. In its final document, the 2010 Review Conference had emphasized the importance of a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and had endorsed practical steps that included the convening of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States, and also emphasized that the 2012 Conference should take as its terms of reference the 1995 resolution.

7. It is gravely disappointing and highly regrettable that, notwithstanding the commitment made in 2010 to convene the 2012 Conference, it was never held, under the pretext of baseless and unreasonable justifications. Consequently, commitments related to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East remain unfulfilled in the context of the Treaty.

8. Egypt had spared no effort to achieve a successful 2015 Review Conference and continued to strive towards consensus on a final outcome document. For five consecutive years, in the lead-up to the Review Conference, Egypt, with the support of the Arab Group, the Non-Aligned Movement and other regional groups, spared no effort to implement the 2010 action plan pertaining to the Middle East and engaged positively with efforts in this regard. This was strongly demonstrated by the full engagement of Egypt in informal meetings convened in Glion and Geneva. Notwithstanding such engagement in several informal consultative meetings, it was unfortunate that after extensive consultations and negotiations, the 2012 Conference was never held, in contravention of the 2010 final outcome document.

9. The Arab Group and the Non-Aligned Movement had presented working papers providing a simplified approach, laying out practical and detailed steps for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The working papers presented pragmatic and realistic proposals. The elements of the working papers were drafted in accordance with the principles for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as adopted by the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission. Egypt had welcomed the efforts of and the ideas presented by the Russian Federation in its efforts to bridge differences.

10. It was deeply unfortunate that only three States parties (Canada, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America) opted to block the much-desired consensus during the 2015 Review Conference. By doing so, and by forfeiting the opportunity to reach to an agreeable outcome document, those three countries not only pushed the vision of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East farther away, but, equally important, blocked efforts to strengthen the Treaty regime itself across all its three pillars, namely, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a result, not only were five valuable years spent strengthening the Treaty wasted, but the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

remained unfulfilled, in complete breach of the legal commitment and the understanding reached in 1995 on the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

III. Moving forward: 2017-2020 review cycle of the Treaty

11. Egypt is of the view that the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East must remain a central topic in the 2017-2020 review cycle of the Treaty, not only on the basis of its political and security merits, but, more important, because the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on the basis of which the Treaty was indefinitely extended.

12. In this regard, Egypt stresses the special responsibility of the three co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) to implement it. We believe that the co-sponsors have a special duty and responsibility to present their ideas and chart the way forward to implement the resolution. We expect that the co-sponsors will present practical and constructive proposals aimed at its implementation with immediate effect. Against the backdrop of the unsuccessful experience of the past review cycle, and as we embark on a new one, the introduction of new and alternative approaches and mechanisms to achieve the prompt implementation of the resolution becomes necessary. Any further delay by the co-sponsors in the implementation of the resolution could lead, once again, to an unfavourable outcome of the next Review Conference.

13. Egypt stresses the urgency and importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty. We recall that the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences reaffirmed the importance of the accession of Israel to the Treaty, and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Regrettably, no progress has been achieved so far in this regard. Notwithstanding the collective adherence by every State in the region to the Treaty, Israel remains the only country that refuses to adhere to it. At a time when the international community is working diligently to address other regional non-proliferation cases, it is essential that issues related to non-proliferation be addressed comprehensively, without selectivity.

14. Accordingly, the 2017-2020 review cycle of the Treaty should demand that Israel accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place all its nuclear facilities promptly under the IAEA full-scope safeguards and conduct all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty.

15. Notwithstanding the unfortunate outcome of the previous Treaty review cycle, Egypt is engaging the new cycle with a forward-looking approach. It is imperative that we overcome the failure of the 2015 Review Conference and ensure a positive and constructive start of the new cycle.

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1 May 2017

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 2-12 May 2017

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)

1. Despite the international community's strong and consistent opposition to North Korea's ongoing development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programme, it has not abandoned or ceased its existing nuclear programme and related activities and continues to conduct testing activities. In this regard, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative views North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programme as one of the most serious challenges to the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime built up around the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

2. The Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have remained seized of North Korea's provocative actions over a long period of time. In the final document of the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference strongly urged North Korea to fulfil the commitments under the Six-Party Talks, including the complete and verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in accordance with the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks of September 2005, and urged North Korea to return, at an early date, to the Treaty and to its adherence with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement. The Conference also called on North Korea and all States parties to fully implement all relevant nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. The Conference reaffirmed its firm support for the Six-Party Talks and determined to achieve the satisfactory and comprehensive resolution to the issues involved through diplomatic means.

3. North Korea conducted nuclear tests on 9 October 2006, on 25 May 2009, on 12 February 2013, on 6 January 2016 and, most recently, on 9 September 2016, in repeated violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. On 30 November 2016, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2321 (2016), in which it condemned, in the strongest terms, the nuclear test conducted by North Korea on 9 September 2016 and reaffirmed the Council's decisions, including that North Korea should abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes. North

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Korea has also continued its ballistic missile programmes; it launched more than 20 ballistic missiles in 2016 and has continued to conduct launches in 2017. North Korea's ballistic missile launches are also in grave violation of its obligations under Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016).

4. Considering the situation regarding North Korea, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative expresses the following points and recommends that the next Review Conference should remain seized of the matter.

- North Korea's nuclear- and missile-related activities are clear violations of relevant Security Council resolutions, as well as of the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks of September 2005, and they represent a grave challenge to the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime centred on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- The Initiative condemns, in the strongest terms, the nuclear tests conducted by North Korea. It also strongly condemns North Korea's ongoing nuclear activities, including the restart and operation of the 5 MW(e) graphite-moderated reactor and the expansion and operation of the uranium enrichment facilities at Yongbyon, and urges North Korea to halt all such activities.
- The Initiative condemns, in the strongest terms, the ballistic missile activities carried out by North Korea, noting that such activities contribute to North Korea's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and further increase tensions.
- The Initiative reaffirms that, in accordance with the Treaty, North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State, as stated in Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) and in the final document of the 2010 Review Conference.
- The Initiative urges North Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests or launches that use ballistic missile technology, nor to engage in any other destabilizing or provocative actions. It renews its strong demand for North Korea to immediately and fully implement the relevant Security Council resolutions, as well as the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks of September 2005, to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to return, at an early date, to the Treaty and to the IAEA safeguards agreement.
- The Initiative emphasizes the importance for all States to ensure the sustained and comprehensive implementation and enforcement of all relevant Security Council resolutions.

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Suggestions for the 2017 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference from the perspective of the progressive approach

Working paper submitted by Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey

1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses regime and thus an essential pillar of global peace and security. The 2020 Treaty review cycle should be forward-looking and focus on States parties' common interests in supporting and strengthening the Treaty. The Treaty provides the foundation for States to work together on key building blocks to achieve common objectives. It contains hard-won treaty-level commitments to the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons, as provided in article VI.

2. As we commence the 2020 Treaty review cycle, we need to reaffirm the centrality of the Treaty and to focus on a "progressive approach" to the implementation of the consensus 2010 action plan and the 13 practical steps to disarmament agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. We must also maintain our focus on challenges to the critical role of the Treaty in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Any process that can effectively lead us to a world free of nuclear weapons will by necessity be an inclusive one. We must continue our efforts to ensure the participation of States with nuclear weapons in initiatives by engaging in dialogue that will guide us progressively towards the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

3. We must take into account the prevailing international security environment. Only by addressing both the security and the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons can we take the incremental but necessary steps that will enhance security for all and provide the best chance of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. The only way to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is through effective, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament. This will only be achieved through the constructive engagement of all relevant parties.

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4. Progress in multilateral nuclear disarmament also requires the promotion of practical and effective confidence-building measures. Trust must be built through the demonstrated implementation of concrete disarmament measures by nuclear-weapon States, as well as a commitment to non-proliferation by all non-nuclear-weapon States and continuing support for the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which ensure confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, the central role of IAEA in assisting Member States to ensure the highest levels of safety and security is essential to facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

5. Renewed momentum has been given to a number of parallel and simultaneous measures, or "building blocks", which are necessary to achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The 2010 action plan is the consensus-based road map for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and it is vitally important that all States parties continue work to implement those agreed steps.

6. The 2017 Preparatory Commission for the Treaty should work towards a positive agenda for the 2020 Review Conference and demonstrate practical progress in its outcome document. That includes progress on many items in the 2010 action plan, including developing nuclear disarmament verification capabilities, increasing transparency measures, negotiating a verifiable and non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and achieving the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We must be forward-looking, constructive and focused on common ground to advance our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons.